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RECENT DECISIONS

RECENT DECISIONS
ADVERSE POSSESSION - REQUIREMENTS FOR OBTAINING TITLE TO A
CAVE BY ADVERSE PossESSION - Plaintiff and defendant were owners of
adjoining properties. On defendant's land was located the only opening to a
cavern, which a remote grantor of defendant discovered in 1893. Since that
time, defendant and its immediate and remote grantors have improved the
cave for visitors, and conducted persons through it upon the payment of an
admission price. With wide publicity, this has continued for almost fifty years.
Plaintiff first visited the cave in I 895, paying an admission fee for the privilege, and has visited it several times since. A part of said cave extended under
real estate owned by plaintiff, but this fact was not ascertained until a survey
was made in 1932. Defendant, and its grantors, thought that all the cave
was under land belonging to them. Plaintiff brought action to quiet title to the
part of the cavern under his land. Held, defendant did not acquire title to the
part of the cave beneath plaintiff's land by adverse possession. Marengo CfPlle
Co. 'll. Ross, 212 Ind. 624, ION. E. (2d) 917 (1937).
In Indiana the doctrine prevails that when an owner of land, by mistake
as to the true boundary line of his own land, takes actual, visible and exclusive
possession of another's land and holds it as his own for the statutory period, he
thereby acquires title as against the true owner.1 The appellate court was of the
opinion that this rule was applicable to the present situation.2 But the supreme
court denied the similarity of situation for the stated reason that in this case the
defendant's possession was not open and visible. The precise question presented
here does not seem to have arisen before. The closest analogy suggesting itself is
in mineral cases. There the authorities are agreed that land may be divided
horizontally into two or more ownerships, the surface belonging to one person,
and a stratum below the surface to another. 8 And where there has been a severance, possession of the surface will not give title by adverse possession to the
subsurface, and vice versa.4 Where there has not been a severance, the possession
of the minerals, even by continuous mining, cannot operate to give title by
Rennert v. Shirk, 163 Ind. 542, 72 N. E. 546 (1904), and cases cited therein.
Marengo Cave Co. v. Ross, (Ind. App. 1937) 7 N. E. (2d) 59.
8 I TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY, § 252 (1920); Stoughton v. Leigh, I Taunt.
402, 127 Eng. Rep. 889 (1808); Wilkinson v. Proud, IO Mees. & W. 33, 152 Eng.
Rep. 704 (1843); Lillibridge v. Lackawanna Coal Co., 143 Pa. 293, 22 A. 1035
(1891); Lee v. Bumgardner, 86 Va. 315, IO S. E. 3 (1889); Kincaid v. McGowan,
88 Ky. 91, 4 S. W. 802 (1887); Sloan v. Lawrence Furnace Co., 29 Ohio St. 568
(1876); Snoddy v. Bolen, 122 Mo. 479, 24 S. W. 142 (1893); Brand v. Consolidated
Coal Co., 219 Ill. 543, 76 N. E. 849 (1906); Cox v. Colossal Cavern Co., 210 Ky.
612,276 S. W. 540 (1925). See also 35 MICH. L. REV. u90 (1937).
4 RicKETrS, AMERICAN MINING LAw, § u22 (1931); CosTIGAN, MINING LAw,
§ 153 (1908); I BARRINGER and ADAMS, THE LAw OF MINES AND MINING IN THE
UNITED STATES 568 (1900); Catlin Coal Co. v. Lloyd, 176 Ill. 275, 52 N. E. 144
(1898); Algonquin Coal Co. v. Northern Coal & Iron Co., 162 Pa. u4, 29 A. 402
(1894); Armstrong v. Caldwell, 53 Pa. 284 (1866); Caldwell v. Copeland, 3-7 Pa.
427, 78 Am. Dec. 436 (1860).
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adverse possession unless the possession was open, visible, and notorious. 5 In a
novel case such as here presented, it would seem peculiarly necesary to consider
the purpose of the statute of limitations. Some authorities have expressed the
purpose as being to prevent the making of illegal claims after the evidence
necessary to defeat them has been lost, barring the former owner by reason of
his demerit rather than any supposed merit in the wrongful possessor. 6 But other
authorities, including the Indiana Supreme Court itself, have declared the
philosophy of the statute to be the protection of long-asserted ownership.7 This
view would seem to favor defendant, and when questions of policy are also
considered such result seems eminently reasonable. Although plaintiff did not
know defendant was trespassing, and could not have discovered this fact except
by a survey, yet the possession of defendant was as open and as visible aS it
could have been under the circumstances, and rather than do anything to conceal his possession, defendant had widely publicized it. Defendant's occupation
of the cave does not interfere with plaintiff's enjoyment of the surface, and
nothing appears to show that plaintiff would be able to make either a present or
future use of the cavern. 8 It is suggested that considerations of policy overwhelmingly support defendant, particularly in a court committed to the doctrine
that the statute of limitations is designed to protect long-asserted ownership.
Nor is it clear that the court's distinction of this case from the ordinary mistaken-boundary case is a valid one. The court differentiates the two by pointing
out that here plaintiff could not determine that defendant was trespassing upon
his land except by a survey. It is submitted that the same fact must be true in the
majority of cases where a party claims title up to a mistaken boundary line
by adverse possession, and that there really is no fundamental difference between
rather frequent mistaken-boundary cases and the present one.
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5 CosTIGAN, MINING LA.w, § 153 (1908); Pierce v. Barney, 209 Pa. 132, 58 A.
152 (1904); Pardee v. Murray, 4 Mont. 234, 2 P. 16 (1882). In these cases, however, there is this important distinguishing feature: the plaintiff had never been
down in the defendant's mine, and had no knowledge of its extent.
6 2 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY, § 500 (1920), and cases cited therein.
7 Craven v. Craven, 181 Ind. 553 at 560, 105 N. E. 41 (1914): "The intention
[ of the statute of limitations] is not to punish one who neglects to assert his right,
but to protect those who maintained the possession of land for the time specified by
the statute under claim of right or color of title." Mclver v. Ragan, 2 Wheat. (15 U.S.)
25, 4 L. Ed. 175 (1817); LANGDELL, EQUITY PLEADING, § 121 (1883); and see,
Ballantine, "Title by Adverse Possession," 32 HARV. L. REV. 135 (1918).
8 For an interesting discussion of the question as to whether plaintiff ever did
own that part of the cave under his land, see 4 UNIV. CHI. L. REv. 680 at 682
( 1937), where the writer says: "Considerations of policy dictate that the person who
owns land should have no claim of ownership to a cave which lies so far beneath his
land that he cannot reasonably expect to reach and use it. By analogy to air law, his
only right should be that the laws be not so used as to interfere unreasonably with his
enjoyment of the surface."

